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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiffs and the court of appeals advocate a new legal landscape where parties will be
required to openly second guess the trial court's legal rulings in order to preserve an issue
for appeal and then present irrelevant legal issues at trial, even though the jury cannot and
should not be involved in resolving the legal issues. In contrast, Hanson advocates for
this Court to reaffirm its prior rulings, which provide the following:
•

A party must raise an issue once in order to preserve it for appeal;

•

Whether a duty of care is owed is a legal question for the trial court
to resolve;

•

An appellate court has jurisdiction to review a trial court's pre-trial
rulings on questions of law to ensure that the ruling is correct.

In advocating for a change to Utah law, much of plaintiffs' argument is contrary to
record in this case. Plaintiffs' brief devotes 43 pages in an attempt to justify why the
court of appeals was correct in its decision to decline to reach the merits of Hanson's pretrial motion. Notwithstanding plaintiffs arguments, the issues on which this Court
granted certiorari are straightforward and well defined under existing Utah law. Hanson
requests this Court to reaffirm its prior opinions, reverse the court of appeals, and remand
this case to the court of appeals to consider the merits of whether the trial court erred in
its legal conclusion that Hanson owed the decedent a duty of care.

1

ARGUMENT
I.

Appellate review of pre-trial rulings is a meaningful and fundamental right to
parties.
Summary judgment is an important procedural tool; however, under the court of

appeals' opinion, a defendant will lose the opportunity for meaningful appellate review of
a trial court's ruling on summary judgment. Plaintiffs' and the court of appeals argue that
Hanson was afforded a full and fair opportunity to put on its case at trial and that any
appeal should have been from the trial. See Hanson v. Normandeau, 2007 UT App 382 at
TJ14, Plaintiffs' Brief at p. 33-36. In this case, however, Hanson's appeal was largely
premised on the trial court's pre-trial errors in ruling on Hanson's motion for summary
judgment and related motions. The central theme of Hanson's appeal was that this case
should not have reached trial. In short Hanson's appeal asked the court of appeals to
review the trial court's decision to allow the case to survive summary judgment
The purpose of summary judgment is to allow a party to test the adequacy of a
plaintiffs claim at certain predetermined times during the course of the litigation. In this
case, the scheduling order provided that both fact discovery and expert designations had
concluded. At this point, Hanson moved for summary judgment. Hanson's motion
argued that plaintiffs' claims were legally deficient based on the state of the record as it
existed at the time. Among other points, Hanson argued it owed the decedent no duty of
care based on all of the evidence adduced by the close of fact discovery and based on
plaintiffs' own expert testimony.
Plaintiffs' and the court of appeals' analysis appears to premised on the notion that
2

review of a motion for summary judgment is somehow inferior to review of a trial on the
merits because the evidence is more complete at trial than in a summary judgment motion.
This argument may have some merit if the summary judgment motion was presented
prior to the close of fact and expert discovery or if the trial court reserved its ruling in
order to resolve disputed facts at trial. In this case, however, plaintiffs had access to all of
the evidence presented at trial when Hanson submitted its motion for summary judgment
and the trial court did not find any disputed issues of fact. Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot
argue that appellate review of a motion for summary judgment deprived them of an
opportunity to put on their case.
In addition, plaintiffs' argument also suggests that because they prevailed at trial
then it goes without saying that denial of summary judgment was appropriate. In other
words, plaintiffs are bootstrapping the denial of summary judgment by the jury's award.
In this case, however, the issue of duty was not presented to the jury. As Hanson has
repeatedly argued, the jury does not decide the issue of duty, and therefore, it was not
presented at trial. In fact, the record discloses that the parties and the trial court all
recognized that no disputed issues of fact precluded a ruling on the issue of duty. Hanson
presented its motion to the trial court, and the trial court ruled on the motion.
Now, the court of appeals has denied Hanson the right to have appellate review of
the trial court's pre-trial ruling. The court of appeals' analysis, however, is flawed in
several respects. First, the court of appeals decided the issue of whether the trial court
erred in allowing plaintiffs' to designate a previously undisclosed towing expert in
3

opposition to Hanson's motion. See Hanson, 2007 UT App 382 at ^fl[23-29. Hanson also
appealed whether the trial court erred in allowing plaintiffs to untimely designate an
undisclosed towing expert in order to oppose Hanson's motion for summary judgment.
See Hanson v. Normandeau, 2007 UT App 382 at TJU23-29. Before the court of appeals,
Hanson's appeal of this point was premised on an earlier opinion in Brown v. Jorgensen,
2006 UT App 168, U1J19-22, 136 P.3d 1252, wherein the court of appeals reviewed the
denial of partial summary judgment motion after trial on merits where part of the
argument was to strike improper affidavit used to oppose motion. The court of appeals
concluded that trial court did not error in allowing plaintiffs to use a previously
undisclosed expert.
What happens, however, if the court of appeals decides that the trial court erred in
its decision to allow plaintiffs' to designate the expert? Under this scenario, the expert
designation and the testimony used to oppose Hanson's motion for summary judgment
would have been error; however, the court of appeals would not be able to reach the issue
of whether Hanson was entitled to summary judgment after the improper expert testimony
was excluded. In this scenario, the court of appeals could conclude that the trial court
committed a prejudicial error, but it would be powerless to correct the error because
under its analysis it would lack jurisdiction to review the denial of the summary judgment
motion.
Next, Hanson relied on established precedent that unequivocally allowed for
appellate review and reversal of cases after a jury had decided in plaintiffs' favor because
4

the trial court erred in denying a defendant's motion for summary judgment. See, e.g.,
Prince, Yeates and Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, 94 P.3d 179; Estate Landscape and
Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 844
I . d 22.. (I huh I i ' i
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meaningful appellate review of its defenses to plaintiffs' claims. This Court should
reinforce the value of summary judgment to the process of litigating a case and
meaningful appellate review of summary judgment.
II.

Appellate courts need the ability to rule on whether a case should have went
to trial.
Under both plaintiffs' and the court of appeals' reasoning, Utah's appellate courts

will never have the ability to review a trial court's determination about whether a claim
should have gone to the jury. This Court's prior decisions in Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
v. Young and in Estate Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Co. would not be possible if the court of appeals decision in
this case was correct. The mere fact that a trial court allowed a claim to go to the jury and
that a jury found in plaintiffs' favor does not mean that the trial court ruled correctly.
Both Prince, Yeates and Estate Landscape demonstrate that trial courts sometimes get it
wrong. Parties need appellate review of a trial court's pre-trial rulings on the legal issues
that determine whether or not a claim should be submitted to the jury.
In both Prince, Yeates and Estate Landscape, this Court reversed final judgments
awarded to a party because the claim should not have gone to trial. For example, in
Estate Landscape, the trial court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
issue of an accord and satisfaction defense. See Estate Landscape and Snow Removal
Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322, 325
(Utah 1992). The case went to trial, and plaintiff prevailed on its claims. On appeal, this
Court reversed the trial court's pre-trial denial of defendant's accord and satisfaction
6
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intertwined with trial issues. The trial court had an obligation to resolve the threshold
legal issue before trial, and the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the issue on
appeal in order to determine if the trial court's legal ruling was correct.
The court of appeals' ruling in this case, however, changes the landscape in Utah.
Under the court of appeals' opinion, the parties in Estate Landscape and Prince, Yeates
would no longer be able to appeal the denial of the pre-trial motions for summary
judgment. In short, the parties could not seek appellate review of whether the trial court
correctly determined threshold legal rulings. Because the court of appeals' decision
conflicts with Utah law and precludes meaningful appellate review of a trial court's pretrial rulings, this Court should reverse and remand to the court of appeals to review the
merits of whether Hanson owed a legal duty of care.
III.

Plaintiffs, rather than Hanson, have focused on the issue of foreseeability, and
Plaintiffs have argued that duty is a fact issue only on appeal.
Throughout this case, Hanson has consistently argued that duty is legal issue that

the trial court could rule on as a matter of law and that the court of appeals could review
for correctness. Hanson's position is consistent with Utah law, which unequivocally
states that duty is a legal issue that the trial court must decide. See Webb v. University of
Utah, 2005 UT 80,1f9, 125 P.3d 906. Before the court of appeals, Hanson appealed the
trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment, arguing that the trial court erred
as a matter of law in concluding that Hanson owed a duty of care.
Although conceding that duty is a legal issue, plaintiffs go to great length to
demonstrate why in this particular case it was a factual issue for trial. Thus, although
8

Utah law provides that duty of care is a pre-trial legal issue for the trial court it became a
factual issue for trial in this case. In addition to being entirely inconsistent with Utah law,
the record in this case belies plaintiffs' argument on appeal
Plaintiffs start their argument by saying that it was Hanson who interjected the
issue of foreseeability into the mix and transformed the legal issue into a factual issue. In
fact, Hanson's motion for summary judgment focused on the relationship of the parties.
(R. at 626-31). Hanson's motion discussed the nature of the relationship between a repair
shop and a subsequent tow truck driver. In its discussion, Hanson did note that the trial
court should look at foreseeability among the many factors used to determine whether a
duty of care is owed. (R. at 628). Consistent with the factors used to determine when a
legal duty of care is owed, Hanson argued it owed no duty because of the remoteness of
the parties' relationship and because it was unforeseeable that a tow truck driver would be
injured because he negligently performed his job. (R. at 630-31)
In their memorandum, plaintiffs advanced alternative arguments in opposition to
Hanson's motion on whether a duty of care was owed. Plaintiffs argued either a legal
duty of care was owed based on the undisputed facts of the case, or in the alternative,
there were factual issues for trial. (R. at 822, 861-62). Although plaintiffs asserted the
alternative argument, plaintiffs' opposition memorandum argued that the trial court could
determine that Hanson owed a legal duty as a matter of law. (R. at 861-62). Plaintiffs
argued the issue turned on foreseeability rather than the relationship between the parties
that Hanson framed in its motion. Because of the arguments in plaintiffs' opposition
9

memorandum, Hanson's reply memorandum addressed the issue of foreseeability in the
context of whether Hanson owed a legal duty of care. (R. at 1155-61).
At oral argument, plaintiffs abandoned their alternative argument that the issue of
duty of care was a trial issue. Instead, plaintiffs argued that duty was a pre-trial legal
issue that the trial court should rule on as a matter of law. (R. at 2078: 48). Specifically,
plaintiffs' counsel instructed the trial court as follows: "Duty is decided by the Court, as
a matter of law. I don't think there's an issue here that the jury needs to decide. This is ought to be decided by the Judge, by the Court, whether or not there's a duty." (R. at
2078: 48).
Based on the parties' briefing - both of which stated that the issue of duty should
be resolved as a matter of law, and the oral argument - in which the trial court was
instructed that it should rule on the issue of duty as a matter of law, the trial court ruled on
the issue of duty as a matter of law. (R. at 1182-86). Nothing in either the trial court's
oral ruling or its written ruling suggested that the trial court did not understand the issue,
wanted further evidence on the issue, wanted further briefing on the issue, or was
reserving the issue for trial. (R. at 1182-86; 2078: 38, 53-54). Consistent with Utah law,
the trial court resolved the issue of duty as a matter of law prior to trial. Finally, plaintiffs
drafted the written order which unequivocally denied Hanson's motion without any
further instruction. (R. at 1182-86).
Notwithstanding Utah law holding that duty is a legal issue, the parties' briefing
that argued that duty was a legal issue, the parties' oral argument that instructed the trial
10

court to rule as a matter of law, and the trial court's ruling that did not disclose that any
issues of fact precluded summary judgment, plaintiffs now argue that the trial court's
ruling may not have addressed the issue as a matter of law and that it could have been
based on undisclosed and hidden issues of fact that were never disclosed in the record to
Hanson. (Plaintiffs' brief at pp. 20-22)
Before the court of appeals, plaintiffs cited to case law and argued that appealing a
motion for summary judgment after a trial on the merits was akin to planting a bomb at
the early stages of litigation and then exploding it on appeal. Such an argument would
suggest that plaintiffs were surprised to learn on appeal that Hanson was contesting
whether it owed a legal duty of care. At all stages of this case, Hanson has asserted it
owed no duty of care.
In contrast, plaintiffs admitted to the trial court that the issue of duty was legal
issue that could be ruled on before trial. Plaintiffs did not request any jury instructions on
the issue of establishing that Hanson owed it a duty of care. Rather, the issue of duty was
resolved before trial as a matter of law. On appeal, plaintiffs now argue that the issue of
duty is a question of fact that either was presented or should have been presented at trial.
Plaintiffs, however, instructed the trial court that it should rule on the issue as a matter of
law - thereby planting the bomb, and then argue on appeal that it was a fact issue for trial
- exploding it on appeal. Accordingly, it is plaintiffs rather than Hanson who looked to
plant a bomb in the early stages of the litigation which coulb be exploded on appeal.
Given the facts and circumstances of this case, Hanson did everything that is
11

required under Utah law to preserve an issue for appeal. Hanson raised the issue, and the
trial court ruled on the issue. See Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT
48, ^14, 48 P.3d 968. Under Utah law, the question of duty is a legal issue for the trial
court alone to decide. See Webb, 2005 UT 80 at f9; Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77,
^[8, 67 P.3d 1017. Accordingly, Hanson preserved the issue for appeal.
Moreover, assuming that whether Hanson owed a duty of care was solely based on
foreseeability, the issue is still a legal issue. Plaintiffs attempt to transform whether a
duty of care is owed into a factual issue by repeated references to the whether or not it
was foreseeable to Hanson that a tow truck driver would not do his job correctly.
Plaintiffs also argue that Hanson never argued that foreseeability was an issue of law.
Again, this argument is belied by the record. At all times in this case, Hanson has argued
that duty was a legal issue. Although whether or not a duty is owed is based on several
factors, including foreseeability, the issue of duty is ultimately a legal issue and
accordingly resolution of the factors that relate to duty is also a legal issue. In other
words, the fact that foreseeability may be factual in nature does not transform the issue of
whether a duty of care is owed into a factual issue. Furthermore, which of the factors is
most important to the duty analysis in a particular case does change whether it is a legal
or factual issue. If issues of fact concerned the trial court or prevented a ruling on the
issue, Hanson was entitled to be made aware of that fact. The record does not disclose
that any issues of fact concerned the trial court in its ruling on Hanson's motion on the
issue of duty. Rather, the trial court understood the issue, found that Hanson owed a duty
12

of care, and created a dangerous situation.
In certain instances, it is conceivable that a trial court may reserve its ruling on the
issue or require resolution of certain factual issues necessary to rule on the issue of duty;
however, a party is entitled to be aware of what those factual issues are so that it is not
blind-sided on appeal. If issues of fact precluded summary judgment, the trial court did
not make any of the parties aware of that fact. If the issue of duty was presented at trial,
neither of the parties nor the jury was aware of that fact. Moreover, it would be
inconsistent with Utah law for the jury to decide the issue of duty.
Notwithstanding all of plaintiffs' arguments that issues of fact could have
precluded summary judgment and that related issues were presented to the jury, this case
presents a relatively straightforward appeal of a pre-trial legal issue that the trial court
resolved on the merits. The court of appeals erred when it concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction to review the denial of Hanson's motion for summary judgment on the issue
of whether a duty of care was owed. This Court should reverse the court of appeals'
conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to review Hanson's pre-trial motion for summary
judgment.
IV.

The law of the case doctrine allows trial court, not the parties, discretion to
revisit issues.
After a trial court resolves an issue on the merits, a party does not need to re-raise

the issue in order to preserve appellate review. Hanson followed Utah law in presenting
the issue of duty to the trial court and preserving the issue for appellate review. Plaintiffs
are now attempting to change the rules to require future litigants to wonder how many
13

times an issue needs to be raised and re-raised in order to preserve the issue for appellate
review.
Plaintiffs' argument that Hanson could have and should have raised the issue of
duty at trial or in a post-trial motion in order to preserve the issue for appeal is contrary to
Utah law. Plaintiffs' argument on this point implicates the law of the case doctrine. As
this Court recently had the occasion to discuss: "under the law of the case doctrine, 'a
decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the
same litigation.'" IHCHealth Services, Inc. v. D&KManagement, Inc., 2008 UT 36 at
T[26. Importantly, this Court noted: "the doctrine allows a court to decline to revisit issues
within the same case once the court has ruled on them. In this way, the law of the case
doctrine acts much like the doctrine of res judicata - furthering the goals of judicial
economy and finality - but within a single case." Id. This Court set forth how the law of
the case doctrine works procedurally in the trial court: "While a case remains pending
before the district court prior to any appeal, the parties are bound by the court's prior
decision, but the court remains free to reconsider that decision. It may do so sua sponte or
at the suggestion of one of the parties. And this discretionary power of reconsideration
includes the right of the district court to decline to reopen a matter it has already decided."
Id.2X%Ll.
Assuming that the trial court erred in denying Hanson's motion for summary
judgment, plaintiffs' argue that nothing prevented Hanson from re-raising the issue at trial
and in a motion at trial. Technically, nothing ever prevents Hanson or any other party
14

from raising, re-raising, and re-raising again and again while the case is pending before
the trial court. This Court has clearly articulated, however, that a party needs to only raise
an issue one time in order to preserve it for appeal. See Brookside Mobile Home Park,
Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, If 14, 48 P.3d 968 ("once trial counsel has raised an issue
before the trial court, and the trial court has considered the issue, the issue is preserved
for appeal."). Furthermore, this Court has articulated that a motion to reconsider is no
longer allowed. See Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 2 4 , \ 1 , 135 P.3d 861. Finally, under the
law of the case doctrine, the trial court alone has discretion to reopen an issue that is has
already decided. Hanson was powerless to reopen the issue after the trial court had ruled
on it, but plaintiffs' advocate that Hanson was required to repeatedly spit into the wind if
it wanted to preserve an argument for appeal.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue that a party should re-raise an issue that has already
been ruled on in order to preserve it for appeal. Furthermore, plaintiffs argue that a party
should do this despite the fact that none of the issues presented at trial implicate the trial
court's prior ruling. Plaintiffs argue it is incumbent on Hanson to divine that the trial
court wanted to revisit the issue of duty at trial despite the fact that nothing in the record
would suggest to Hanson that the trial court was interested in reopening its prior ruling.
Plaintiffs' argument runs afoul of the law of the case doctrine and this Court's
prior rule in Brooks ide. Under plaintiffs' argument, parties will have to guess at what is
sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal. Judicial economy will not served by requiring
the parties to re-raise issues that the trial court has already addressed. Based on Utah law
15

that provides that whether a duty of care is a threshold legal determination, this court
should decline to require parties to re-raise an issue at trial in order to preserve it for
appeal. Such a rule would only further tax judicial resources and creates confusion as to
when an issue is adequately preserved for appeal.
CONCLUSION
Rather than limiting the scope of appellate review and creating unnecessary
confusion as to what is enough to preserve an issue for appeal, Hanson requests this Court
to reverse the court of appeals' decision and to remand for consideration of the merits of
Hanson's pre-trial motion.

DATED this . ^

day of July, 2008.
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